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Adopting the metaphilosophical perspective, the article considers some implications of the
relationship between two contemporary thinkers able to open two important new
perspectives of thought: Emanuele Severino and Graham Priest. Severino reasons with the
theoretical instruments involving the logical ones; on the other hand, Priest with that of the
logical which secondarily involve the theoretical ones. Both are interested in
metaphilosophical questions, among which the relationships between truth,
contradiction/non-contradiction, and logic emerge as important. However, their solutions
are quite different, if not completely opposite. The aim of this brief essay is not to make a
comparison between them, but rather to retrace their possible contributions in normal
science and any possible paradigm shift passing through the epistemological question. The
paper attempts to open the discussion on their contributions to find their differences but
also their possible areas of consonance. 
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Introduction
This present brief contribution to the second number of “Eternity and
Contradiction” traces the relationship between Emanuele Severino and
Graham Priest with respect to their importance in the area of metaphi-
losophy and then of epistemology, since both can somehow be defined as
metaphilosophers. In fact, their work discusses philosophy and the main
points of philosophy. Indeed, their work analyses the aims, boundaries,
methods, and, especially, the question inherent to the definition of truth,
logic, and reality. In particular, we want to stress some epistemological
key concepts of science and their connection with other possible concep-
tualizations derived from different ways that knowledge indicates reality
(Lazerowitz, 1970). From a metaphilosophical point of view, this specific
area of thinking is particularly significant, since many authors, episte-
mologists, and scientists want to reduce all philosophy into the brackets
of science and its methodologies. This effect is due to the fact that science
is considered a priori, able to construct/explain the world out and inde-
pendent of the mind. For example, in their Introduction to Metaphiloso-
phy, Søren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert and Stephen Burwood (2013, p. 45)
recall the declaration of Stephen Hawking, in which he expressed the
opinion that philosophy is dead because it was not able to keep up with
modern developments in science, particularly physics. From this per-
spective, scientists would have replaced philosophers as “bearers of the
torch of discovery in the human quest for knowledge”, because philoso-
phy is an outdated form of thought surpassed by contemporary history
and scientific technological strategies that can find answers to important
and concrete questions. In reaction to the Continental and phenomeno-
logical philosophy, the New Realism moves precisely in this direction
(Ferraris, 2014), affirming that human conceptual schemes and percep-
tual apparatus play a constitutive role to the tangible world. However, as
widely considered by Severino (i.e. 1984, pp. 203-5), in discussing the
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Hegelian dialectic on “certainty vs. truth”, this perspective had already
and definitively been refuted by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In-
deed, it is quite difficult to infer any possible form of reality today on the
basis of “certainty”, especially after the critical discussion sprung from
the Vienna circle and developed from Herbert Feigl to Paul and Patricia
Churchland. Indeed, their eliminative materialism, claiming that human
understanding is deeply wrong, affirms that mental states posited do not
actually exist and have no role in thinking truth, because thoughts are
only states of the neurological matter and cannot observe themselves. 
The theme of illusion and error is at the basis of scientific investiga-
tion, which, although based on hypothetical and falsifiable assumptions,
always considers the principle of verification on the basis of the recogni-
tion of error. This is certainly the territory where philosophy and science
find their meeting point. But the most insidious problem for science is to
observe reality without seeing the distortions that the observation instru-
ment can put into the observed field. Philosophical reflection, in partic-
ular the epistemology, helps scientists in the complex work of recognizing
theoretical and/or methodological biases; whereas, from criticism, they
often take the shape that Thomas Kuhn (1962) called “paradigm shifts”
which are structures of knowledge able to remove conceptual limitations.
Overgaard, Gilbert, and Burwood point out that Hawking’s statement,
despite his persuasion of speaking only scientifically, utilizes a language
hugely rooted in philosophical background. The fundamental problem on
which such forms of reductionism are founded is perfectly foreshadowed
by Edwin Abbott, author of the satirical novel Flatland: A Romance of
Many Dimensions (1884), in which the setting is described as a two-di-
mensional world. It is inhabited by geometric figures, in which women are
segmented lines, men are various polygons, and the narrator is a square
that guides readers through the implications of life in two dimensions. The
difficulty is that of being aware of the air we breathe, or, as Einstein said
(1950, p. 5), the water where fish swim: “Of what is significant in one’s
own existence one is hardly aware, and not bother the other fellow. What
does a fish know about the water in which he swims all life?” Priest, in his
paper “What is philosophy” (2006, p. 189), sketches the same question,
saying, “Any person knows by acquaintance what breathing is; but this
does not mean that they know the nature of breathing: its mechanism and
function”. Following this metaphor, we can say that both Severino and
Priest are metaphilosopher because they want to discover the meaning of
water, showing the fishes how they are immersed in it. 
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In his book Beyond the Limits of Thought, Priest introduces a sense of
his studies affirming that “Finitude is a basic fact of human existence.
Whether one treats this as a source of sorrow or of relief, it is without
doubt that there are limits to whatever people want to do, be they limits
of human endurance, resources, or of life itself. What these limits are, we
can sometimes only speculate; but that they are there, we know. For ex-
ample, we can only guess what the limit time for running a mile is; but
we know that there is a limit, set by the velocity of light, if not by many
more mundane things” (1995, p. 3). Priest’s perspective considers certain
kinds of limits of the mind that he calls “limits of thought, though
‘thought’, here, should be understood in its objective, Fregean, sense, as
concerning the contents of our intentional states, not our subjective con-
sciousness. [...]. Limits of this kind provide boundaries beyond which
certain conceptual processes (describing, knowing, iterating, etc.) cannot
go; a sort of conceptual ne plus ultra. […] My thesis is that such limits
are dialetheic; that is, that they are the subject, or locus, of true contra-
dictions. The contradiction, in each case, is simply to the effect that the
conceptual processes in question do cross these boundaries” (ibid).
Severino is also rigorously interested in the clear definition of the error
and everything that conceals it, causing the delusion of certainty. He ex-
plains the impossibility of Western rational thought to understand its
fundamental fault. The philosopher defines the boundaries within all this
philosophy develops “nihilism”, which is the language conceiving beings
isolated from their necessary eternity. This isolation causes a fundamental
real contradiction, which indicates impossible contents that cannot be
true, because they are all immersed in the paradoxical believing that being
is nothing. However, his discourse considers science as a radical form of
faith because it is entirely immersed in an abysmal fundamental error.
1. Beyond the logic or beyond the limits of the error?
Also, Hilary Putnam (1992), after developing the links between mathe-
matics, logic, and philosophy and then wandering around a renewal of
philosophy while dealing with Wittgenstein, relativism, deconstruction-
ism, unrealism, and the conundrums related to the representations, was
convinced that philosophy is increasingly dominated by science, because
of the belief that science is able to describe the world in itself, that is, to
objectify the reality. Indeed, the evolution of his perspective, caused by
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difficulties related to the definition of what reality is, sprang from the
problem of defining what allows us to know what we know and how:
“meaning of meaning” (Putnam, 1975, pp. 215-271). 
As Severino and Priest discuss, the fundamental framework that per-
mits to manage these reflections is what is indicated as “truth” that means
the discourse without errors, articulated in a formal structure (logic),
which content are related to being (ontology), whereas “reality” is exactly
the expression of their contact. Whether the debate on the validity of
metaphilosophy seems to be endless, despite it is surely acceptable that this
field of study is still philosophy in itself, however, it is possible to recognize
that the two authors stay at a superior level, giving an important contribu-
tion in the renewal of philosophy, from which it is recognizable the fun-
damental structure of thought and the same meaning of meaning. Indeed,
both of them found their reflection on the sense of truth and of non-truth
from which their logic derives, analysing the role and limits of the Princi-
ple of Non-Contradiction PNC). The question consists of defining if their
standpoints are radically opposite or they can somehow be integrated.
Priest is famous because coined the word ‘dialetheism’ and developed
this area of logic, which is define “paraconsistent”. Dialetheism affirms
that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. A “di-
aletheia” is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true,
and dialetheism is the view that there are dialetheias. Such statements are
called ‘true contradictions’. From a metaphilosophical point of view, log-
ic is a crucial element because, as argued by Michael Dummett (2010, p.
4, 13), if philosophy is rooted in the “systematic quest for truth”, logic
defines the grammar of the statements, guaranteeing the possibility of
developing substantial accordance between different philosophical view-
points, epistemology, and sciences. From this perspective, thanks to the
the language of logic, whose grammar contains expressions that cannot
be inconsistent with the content it indicates, philosophy defines what
makes sense, as Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle debated. However,
dialetheias indicate that the ἔλεγχος (èlenchos), one of the fundamental
principles of logic, is no longer considered a universal law. In this way,
does not logic simply become a formal way to describe any form of
speech as pronounceable?
Against this direction, for his part, despite the growing success of the
epistemologies of suspicion, of the thought of disenchantment, and of
the perspectives of uncertainty, Severino’s discourse developed, proceed-
ing through a vigorous critique of the science, technique, and meta-
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physics, but also any form of weakness characterizing the strategies of
contemporary thought for overcoming the traditional use of principle of
non-contradiction (PNC) to indicate truth. His main goal is to identify
the dynamics that necessarily produce the sunset of truth as understood
by traditional thought, and above all, to show how both the traditional
way of thinking truth and all the contemporary forms of confuting it are
at the same time the expression of the extreme alienation reached by
Western philosophy (nihilism). In this way, Severino’s indication has ir-
revocably distanced itself from the entire history of philosophy, since it
aims to exhibit how its framework could not but engender the destruc-
tion of the whole philosophical tradition and especially how it attempts
to know the ultimate truth about the meaning of reality. And this path,
which questions the way in which the meaning of truth has been under-
stood by the tradition, is not only inevitable but also an expression of the
greatest rigor achieved by the traditional thought (in particular, the epis-
temic metaphysics). Undoubtedly, the rigour of Severino’s thought on: a)
the authentic sense of truth; b) the forms and the reasons why philoso-
phy (“Western thought”) has thought for the first time and in an irre-
versible way the sense of the truth; c) the forms and the reasons why phi-
losophy has radically and utterly betrayed the sense of truth; d) the solu-
tion of the Western thought error (nihilism) makes Severino a great crit-
ical philosopher but also a great re-founder of the same sense of truth. 
2. Future Philosophy
First and foremost, Priest is interested in the loss of universality by the
logic that decrees the possibility is increasing to make any speech logical.
Quoting Thomas Kuhn, Priest considers philosophy as “subversive. Time
and philosophers have shot at religions, political systems, public mores.
They do this because they are prepared to challenge things which every-
body else takes for granted, or whose rejection most people do not coun-
tenance” (2006, p. 202). And further on he states, “I have suggested that
philosophy is precisely that subject where anything can be challenged and
criticized. This may make it sound terribly negative, as though all that
philosophers try to do is knock things down. That’s not a terribly attrac-
tive picture. Neither is it an accurate one. For philosophy is a highly con-
structive enterprise. Philosophers are responsible for creating many new
ideas, systems of thought, pictures of the world and its features” (p. 203). 
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The future of the Priest’s perspective inheres the consequences with
respect to language, realism, antirealism, and deflationism, but also, in
particular, with metaphysics and contemporary epistemology. In fact, it
is possible to develop the implications of dialetheism with the Aris-
totelian metaphysics, so that the area of incontrovertible truth may be
considered the divine dimension of the absolute being. In this sense, di-
aletheias should be considered as the field of scientific studies, where the
probabilistic calculation should measure the percentage of the degrees of
freedom with respect to truthfulness or approximation to the truth of
each of the two contrary assertions. In this respect, dialetheism should be
a new expression of modern science (i.e. Newtonian and Gelilean). Un-
doubtedly, from this viewpoint, he somehow re-founds the relationships
between truth and opinion related to un-decidability with respect to the
truth of a set of assertions, so that he seems to be an Aristotelian meta-
physician, able to solve the metaphysical problems that have made tradi-
tional thought obsolete in modernity compared to science. On the other
hand, if its application develops in the epistemological field, definitively
aimed at founding indecidability with respect to any opposites that can
be considered true, dialetheism could be the basis of the expansion of all
Taoist and Buddhist epistemologies, which already characterize some
contributes of physics (i.e. Capra, 1975). At the end of this brief analysis,
we want to refer to Kuhn’s perspective again, in particular to his defini-
tion of “normal science”. Since it is the regular work of researchers theo-
rizing within a settled paradigm framework, which permits a slow accu-
mulation of explanations of the world in accord with established broad
theories, without destructuring or challenging the assumptions accumu-
lated during the history of science, then it is possible to say that Priest
further grounds the normal science. Indeed, Priest improves the possibil-
ity to found the maintenance of an area of contradiction which may give
sense to opinions (doxa and, why not, myth). Briefly, in Kuhn’s perspec-
tive, Priest’s contribution can be considered as the logical solution for the
further development of normal science in two of its traditions: the mod-
ern and the contemporary. It all depends on how it is contextualized and
then used in the paraconsistent logic of dialetheism.
Despite his radical and total critique, Severino attributes to philoso-
phy a more eminent magnitude (1984, pp. 17-19), claiming: “Philoso-
phy is born great. The first steps of its history are not the uncertain
preamble to a more mature development of thought but establishes the
fundamental traits of its entire historical course. For tens and tens of mil-
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lennia, man’s existence – globally and in every single aspect – has been
guided by myth. Myth is not meant to be a fantastic invention, but the
revelation of the essential and overall meaning of the world. Even in the
Greek language, the oldest meaning of the word mythos is ‘word’, ‘judg-
ment’, ‘announcement’; sometimes mythos even means ‘the thing itself ’,
‘reality’. Only in a derivative and later way, in the Greek language mythos
means ‘legend’, the ‘fairy tale’, the ‘myth’. For the first time in human
history, the first Greek thinkers came out of the guided existence of myth
and looked it in the face. In their gaze, there is something absolutely new.
That is, the idea of a knowledge that is undeniable appears, and is unde-
niable not because societies and individuals have faith in it, or live with-
out doubting it, but because it itself is capable of rejecting all its adver-
saries. The idea of a knowledge that cannot be denied either by men, by
gods, or by changes in times and customs. An absolute, definitive, incon-
trovertible, necessary, unquestionable knowledge. [...] The first thinkers
called this knowledge with ancient words of the Greek language [...].
These words are sophìa, lógos, alétheia, epistéme. If we want to translate
them, they correspond respectively to ‘knowledge’, ‘reason’, ‘truth’, ‘sci-
ence’. But these words tell us little (or too much) if we do not put them
in relation to that unheard-of meaning. As far as the word philosophy is
concerned, which, however, appears in the Greek language together with
its name, it means, precisely, to the letter, (philo-sophìa) ‘taking care of
knowledge’. If we accept the hypothesis that in sophós, ‘wisdom’, (on
which the abstract term sophìa is construed), resonates, as in the adjective
saphés (‘clear’, ‘manifest’, ‘evident’, ‘true’), the sense of pháos, the ‘light’,
then philosophy means ‘caring for what being in the light’ (outside the
darkness in which the hidden things are instead – and alétheia, truth, lit-
erally means not being hidden) can in no way be denied. ‘Philosophy’
means ‘caring for the truth’; therefore, it also gives the latter term the un-
heard of meaning of ‘absolutely undeniable’”.
This means that not all philosophical content can be denied. In Sev-
erino’s indication, philosophy is the thought that would be freed from
myth through the true discourse, which means it is irrefutable; however,
at the same time, it is not able to maintain its aim; therefore, it is perva-
sive auto-contradiction. The emergence of philosophical thought, as in-
dicated by Severino, is intended to define the line of separation between
true discourse, pointing at the extreme error (nihilism) and making it
recognizable through the “non-error”. Truth is the non-error and its ba-
sis, which is the basis of any possible true discourse. This is what he calls
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the “original structure” and later the “original structure of the destiny of
truth”. Nihilism becomes evident as the fundamental error of traditional
and contemporary thoughts, thanks to the original structure of truth,
which shows the non-sense of the contradictory persuasion that suffers
from the tyranny of time. Definitely, the opposite of the error of nihilism
is the true indication of “destiny”, and the original structure of destiny is
the appearance of what is not other than itself; that is, of the being itself
of every being and, above all, of the beings that appear and that cannot
be denied because its negation denial is self-defeating. Severino indicates
in an irrefutable way (a very true way) the necessary eternity of any single
being, affirming that everything exists forever, and everything is eternal.
The concept of eternity inheres both the entities and the horizon where
the entities appear. The theoretical structure of the irrefutable indication
of eternity (“the necessary being-self of the being that appears”) is the
core of the original structure. The “being’s being itself ” is the dimension
whose negation is self-negation. The original structure of the destiny
shows that the basis of nihilism is faith in the becoming of beings, which
is believed to be an oscillation between being and nothingness, such that
everything can be reduced to a product of contingency. The concept of
“faith in becoming” indicates the acritical assumption of the oscillation
between being and nothing. This faith is the basis of nihilism and found
in both traditional (then metaphysics), contemporary thoughts, and all
sciences. Severino shows that, contrary to what Western philosophy as-
sumes, no becoming appears in the sense of the appearance of the anni-
hilation or of the becoming ‘ex nihilo’ of beings. The scenario of trans-
formation does not testify to creation or annihilation: beings cannot
come into or go out of being, because they cannot be created or annihi-
lated by any God or scientist.
The Severinian indication can recognize and solve any contradiction
indicating the basis of all possible theoretical errors and then can solve
any kind of dialetheias. From this perspective, contemporary epistemol-
ogy is facing a real and substantial scientific revolution, similar to that de-
scribed by Kuhn. As a result, starting from Severino’s indication, a new
epistemology may be opened, because it is possible to change the basic
nihilistic and contradictory Western paradigms, which assume that ‘be-
ing is nothing’ (which means that the basis of being is time) and develop
a new epistemological era that can authentically integrate science, logic,
and ontology (Testoni, 2019; Testoni et al., 2017).
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Conclusion
Despite the fact that Severino’s and Priest’s discourses are so different, it
is possible to find a metaphilosophical dimension, a novel chance, based
on the conceptual structure of eternity. If the challenge of the Severinian
assumption is that consistency is a requirement for truth, validity, mean-
ing, and rationality, on the contrary, dialetheism could consider the pos-
sibility of inconsistent theories that are nevertheless considered meaning-
ful, valid, rational, and true in the area of nihilism. In this sense, incon-
sistency turns out to be a necessary condition for any of these notions
considered in a nihilistic way, and dialetheism could show how consis-
tency turns out not to be an essential characteristic for all nihilistic the-
ories, showing that everything said in the universe of nihilism is a di-
aletheia. Since he works with Priest and was a pupil of Severino, maybe
Francesco Berto could develop such a field of research, perhaps making
the role Severino played in his thinking more explicit. 
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